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Abstract I here distinguish dissensual from consensual
corporate social responsibility (CSR) on the grounds that
the former is more concerned to organize (or portray)
corporate-civil society disagreement than it is corporate-
civil society agreement. In doing so, I first conceive of
consensual CSR, and identify a positive and negative view
thereof. Second, I conceive of dissensual CSR, and suggest
that it can be actualized through the construction of dissent
enabling, rather than consent-oriented, public spheres.
Following this, I describe four actor-centred institutional
theories—i.e. a sociological, ethical, transformative and
economic perspective, respectively—and suggest that an
economic perspective is generally well suited to explaining
CSR activities at the organizational level. Accordingly, I
then use the economic perspective to analyse a dissent
enabling public sphere that Shell has constructed, and
within which Greenpeace participated. In particular, I
explain Shell’s employment of dissensual CSR in terms of
their core business interests; and identify some potential
implications thereof for Shell, Greenpeace, and society
more generally. In concluding, I highlight a number of
ways in which the present paper can inform future research
on business and society interactions.
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Introduction
The idea that corporate social responsibility (CSR) policies
and practices can be oriented towards the organization
(and/or portrayal) of corporate-civil society discordance is
yet to be acknowledged within the CSR literature. By and
large, this conceptual ‘silence’, or oversight, seems due to
the widespread assumption that CSR activities do or should
relate to processes of discursive or reasoned accordance
between corporations and civil society (and/or stakehold-
ers). Furthermore, it is indicated, or revealed, by the fact
that a considerable portion of the CSR literature seeks to
conceive, explain and/or portray the same, or very similar,
consent-oriented CSR practices, in either a positive or
negative light.
Positive writings on consensual CSR, for example, tend
to suggest that corporate-civil society engagement pro-
cesses can help to democratically legitimate a corporation’s
activities so long as they are not ‘corrupted’ by strategic or
instrumental considerations: e.g. the concern to maximize
profits (e.g. Gilbert and Rasche 2007; Scherer and Palazzo
2007). Negative writings, on the other hand, tend to suggest
that, whilst a functional consensus may emerge through
corporate-civil society dialogue, it will in effect always be
‘corrupted’ by some sort of hegemonic and/or discursive
‘violence’ (e.g. Blowfield 2005; Prasad and Elmes 2005).
It is in looking beyond these well established and
competing perspectives of consensual CSR then, that I here
conceive of dissensual CSR: i.e. a form of CSR that is more
concerned to organize (and/or portray) corporate-civil
society dissensus than it is corporate-civil society consen-
sus. Given the nature of my analysis, I emphasize that I
only engage in descriptive-explanatory theorizing, and not
normative–prescriptive theorizing, in the present context.
Nevertheless, and given that I presume the minimal amount
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of civil and political liberties that make corporate-civil
society consent or dissent possible, the argument I advance
only really makes sense with regard to communities
informed by a liberal-democratic ‘‘ethic’’ (Habermas 1995,
pp. 112, 126), or within a ‘‘complex’’ liberal-democratic
‘‘strategical situation’’ (Foucault 1978, pp. 92–93).
I structure the paper as follows. First, I briefly discuss
the consensual orientation of the CSR literature; detail a
specific and positive perspective of consensual CSR that
takes influence from Habermas’s (1990) discourse ethics
(e.g. Gilbert and Rasche 2007); and detail a multifaceted
negative perspective of consensual CSR (e.g. Blowfield
2005) that takes influence from Gramsci’s notion of
hegemony (1971) and Foucault’s notion of discourse (e.g.
1972). Furthermore, I suggest that the positive and negative
perspectives can be non-normatively conceived as acqui-
esce–compromise and compromise–avoid strategies,
respectively (Oliver 1991). Second, I conceive of dissen-
sual CSR with regard to some posited benefits of dissensus
more generally (e.g. Rescher 1993), and suggest that it can
be conceived as a defy strategy (Oliver 1991). Addition-
ally, I combine insights from Habermas (1989) and Fou-
cault (1987), and highlight that dissensual CSR can be
actualized through the construction of what I term dissent
enabling public spheres.
Third, I differentiate four actor-centred, and overlap-
ping, perspectives, on institutional theory: i.e. a sociolog-
ical (e.g. Aguilera and Jackson 2010, p. 530), ethical (e.g.
Habermas 1990), transformative (e.g. Foucault 1984a) and
economic (e.g. Oliver 1991) perspective, respectively.
Whilst recognizing that all four perspectives have their
merit, I suggest the economic perspective is best suited to
explaining CSR activities at the corporate level. Accord-
ingly, I then use the economic perspective to analyze a
dissent enabling public sphere that Shell has recently
constructed, and within which Greenpeace participated. In
particular, I explain Shell’s employment of dissensual CSR
in terms of their core business interests; and identify some
of the potential implications thereof for Shell, Greenpeace,
and society more generally. In concluding, I summarize the
paper’s main contributions, and highlight a number of ways
in which they can inform future research on business and
society interactions.
Consensual Corporate Social Responsibility
CSR is commonly portrayed as a concept and/or practice
that, whilst subject to differing understandings, is ulti-
mately based on an implicit and abstract agreement that it
is concerned to theorize or organize the business-society
interface (Gond and Moon 2011, pp. 16–21). More spe-
cifically, it has been suggested that the theory and practice
of CSR is characterized by a general privileging of consent
over dissent (Blowfield 2005, p. 181).
Evan and Freeman’s (1988, p. 103) work on normative
stakeholder theory for example, which suggests that man-
agement should not ‘‘give primacy to one stakeholder
group over another’’, and that managers should keep
‘‘relationships among stakeholders in balance’’, is clearly
informed by these broader consensual tendencies. So too is
Donaldson and Dunfeee’s (1994) work on integrative
social contracts theory: which states that corporations are
morally obliged to comply with those hypernorms (e.g. the
right to privacy) that all (rational) individuals would con-
sent to in reasonable circumstances.
As these brief remarks indicate, stakeholder theory and
integrative social contracts theory, and the CSR literature
more generally, are informed by a consensual orientation.
Nevertheless, I suggest that it is the international
accountability standards (e.g. Gilbert et al. 2011) and/or
political corporate responsibility (e.g. Scherer and Palazzo
2007) literatures that most clearly emphasize the impor-
tance of corporate-civil society consensus. It is these
writings that I specifically associate with the positive per-
spective of consensual CSR.
The Positive Perspective of Consensual CSR
The positive perspective of consensual CSR relates to at
least two overlapping developments. First, it relates to the
empirical emergence of multi-constituent (and often
transnational) initiatives that develop standards that seek to
make corporations more socially responsible, more envi-
ronmentally responsible, and/or, more accountable to their
stakeholders (e.g. Gilbert et al. 2011). The Forest Stew-
ardship Council—which was ‘‘established in 1993 as a
response to concerns over global deforestation’’, has a
membership composed of non-government organizations
(NGOs) (e.g. World Wildlife Fund) and businesses (e.g.
Tetra Pak), and promotes itself as a ‘‘pioneer forum where
the global consensus on responsible forest management
convenes’’ (FSC)—provides a good example of what I
mean in these regards.
Second, it relates to the belief that the moral legitimacy
of corporate activities is largely dependent on their being
consented to by their stakeholders, and/or, by global civil
society more generally (e.g. Gilbert and Rasche 2007;
Scherer and Palazzo 2011). Perhaps most notably, it is
informed by a specific application of Habermas’s (1990,
p. 66) discourse principle: which states that ‘‘only those
norms can claim to be valid that meet (or could meet) with
the approval of all affected in their capacity as participants
in a practical discourse’’.
As these two developments suggest, the positive per-
spective of consensual CSR emphasizes that, so long as
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multi-stakeholder initiatives are characterized by genuine
moral discourse—and/or are not ‘corrupted’ by corporate
power and/or strategic motivations (Gilbert and Rasche
2007, p. 208; Scherer and Palazzo 2007, p. 1110)—then
they can enable stakeholders to meaningfully act upon their
posited right to hold corporations to account for their
various acts and (moral) omissions (e.g. Gilbert et al. 2011,
p. 24). In short, they suggest that multi-constituent initia-
tives can better ensure that corporate policies and practices
enjoy relatively widespread levels of democratic (and/or
moral) legitimacy.
Whilst the literature on the positive perspective of con-
sensual CSR has both a descriptive and normative dimen-
sion, it can be beneficially looked at in the former terms
alone. In particular, I suggest that once its normative con-
notations are stripped away, this literature begins to look like
an empirical illustration of two of the strategies that Oliver
(1991) discusses in her paper on strategic responses to
institutional pressures: i.e. acquiesce and compromise. In
illustrating this point, I first note that Oliver (1991) com-
pletes the following tasks in her widely cited paper.
First, she identifies five types of institutional pressures—
i.e. cause, constituents, content, control and context—that
corporations can subsequently respond to. Importantly, and
as Table 1 details, the pressure these antecedents place on a
corporation can vary from low to high depending on con-
text. Within the United Kingdom (UK) for example, a fast
food MNC subject to pressure from animal rights activists
would be subject to a low cause of social/moral legitimacy:
for the need to respect animal rights is not a widespread
ethical belief in the UK. On the other hand, if the same
MNC was subject to pressure to respect human rights—
which is a widespread and deeply entrenched ethical belief
in the UK—then it would be subject to a high cause of
social/moral legitimacy.
Second, Oliver (1991) identifies five strategies of
increasing pro-activeness that organizations can employ
when confronted by institutional pressures: i.e. acquiesce,
compromise, avoid, defy and manipulate. As Table 2
details, each of the five strategies is itself associable with
various sub-tactics: e.g. compromise can be associated with
the tactics of balance and pacify.
Third, Oliver (1991) predicts the likelihood of an
organization employing a specific strategy given the pres-
sures they face. Amongst other things then, she suggests
that a corporation (e.g. McDonalds) is likely to employ
more pro-active strategies (e.g. defy) when the ‘content’ of
the pressure (e.g. animal rights) is of a low ‘consistency’
with their interests (e.g. selling meat products). On the
other hand, she suggests that a corporation is likely to
employ a more reactive strategy (e.g. acquiesce) when a
pressure’s ‘cause’ has high moral legitimacy (e.g. the need
for pharmacies to sell safe products).
With the terminology so clarified, I now refer to two
examples to justify my above made claim: i.e. that the
literature on the positive perspective of consensual CSR
often appears to describe, or advocate, a combination of
Oliver’s (1991) strategies of acquiesce and compromise.
First, I highlight that Gilbert and Rasche (2007, pp. 197,
205) provide a clear example of what Oliver (1991, p. 153)
terms a balancing tactic when they suggest that Social
Accountability 8000—i.e. a ‘‘social accountability standard
for retailers, brand companies, suppliers, and other orga-
nizations to maintain decent working conditions through-
out the supply chain on a global basis’’—should initiate a
‘‘moral discourse [that] aims at balancing the interests of
all, or at least the most concerned stakeholders, by
achieving a mutual agreement on the guidelines included in
SA 8000’’. And second, I note that Scherer and Palazzo
(2011, p. 917) provide a similarly clear example of a
compromise strategy when they note that the Forest
Stewardship Council has ‘‘established an internal gover-
nance structure that tries to balance the interest of eco-
nomic actors, NGOs representing social interests, and
NGOs representing environmental issues…’’ In short—and
given that writings on the positive perspective of consen-
sual CSR also talk of the need for MNCs to conform to
consensual and/or participatory ideals more generally (e.g.
Scherer and Palazzo 2011)—I suggest that the activities
discussed within the positive perspective of consensual
CSR literature, can be broadly conceived in terms of an
acquiesce–compromise strategy.
The Negative Perspective of Consensual CSR
Whilst the broad literature on CSR is marked by a general
tendency to privilege and promote the merits of consensus,
there are dissenting voices. In particular, there is a self-
consciously ‘critical’ (e.g. Blowfield 2005; Levy 2008;
Prasad and Elmes 2005) body of work that I here term the
negative perspective of consensual CSR. It differs from the
positive perspective in at least two ways.
First, and whereas the positive perspective suggests that
corporations will sometimes privilege moral considerations
when involved in the above-described multi-stakeholder
initiatives, the negative perspective suggests that corpora-
tions will only ever engage in such initiatives for profit-
focused reasons (Blowfield 2005, p. 181). More specifi-
cally—and whereas the positive perspective portrays cor-
porate involvement in multi-stakeholder initiatives as being
consistent with Oliver’s (1991) acquiesce and compromise
strategies—the negative perspective portrays such involve-
ment in terms of her compromise and avoid strategies.
Second, and whereas the positive view is influenced by
the work of Habermas, the negative view is influenced by
the likes of Gramsci (1971) and Foucault (e.g. 1972). With
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regard to Gramsci, the negative view draws on his idea ‘‘that
hegemony in capitalist democracies relies primarily on
consensual processes that accommodate subordinate groups
to some degree, through a measure of political and material
compromise…’’ (Levy 2008, pp. 951–952). Accordingly, the
negative perspective suggests that NGO involvement in
multi-stakeholder initiatives is less a case of deliberative
democracy between corporations and civil society (Scherer
and Palazzo 2011) than it is a case of corporations co-opting
civil society actors (Blowfield 2005, p. 182).
The negative perspective also draws on Foucault’s
(1972, p. 38) recognition that we all live and operate within
broader ‘‘discursive formations’’: i.e. within orders of
relations ‘‘between objects, types of statement, concepts, or
Table 1 Institutional
antecedents
Developed with reference to
Oliver (1991)
Institutional factor Description of institutional factor/illustration of low–high factor within a
contemporary western democracy (e.g. UK)
Cause
Social/Moral Description: Degree to which factor complies with widespread ethical, moral
or social norms
Legitimacy Low: Animal rights (as ‘equal’ respect for animal and human life)
High: Human rights
Economic efficiency Description: Degree to which factor is consistent with corporation’s
economic interests
Low: Craft techniques from the middle ages
High: Energy (and hence cost) saving initiatives
Constituents
Multiplicity Description: Degree of multiplicity (versus univocity) amongst constituents
regarding factor
Low: Need for religious toleration
High: Best means by which to solve climate change
Dependence Description: Degree to which corporation is dependent on constituents
Low: Fringe social movements with limited power
High: Mainstream consumers and capital providers
Content
Consistency Description: Degree to which norms or requirements are consistent with
corporate interests (e.g. the interests of an alcohol company)
Low: Raising the minimum drinking age from 18 to 25
High: Concern to promote pubs and drinking as a part of British culture
Constraint Description: Degree to which norm diminishes corporate voluntarism
Low: Standards encouraging corporations to promote a healthy lifestyle
amongst employees
High: Standards requiring corporations to provide employees with access to
diet and exercise professionals
Control
Coercion Description: Degree to which factor is legalized/enforced
Low: Drug testing amongst hospitality professionals
High: Drug testing amongst elite footballers
Diffusion Description: Degree to which factor is voluntarily recognized amongst
society
Low: Recognition of discrimination based on body-weight
High: Recognition of discrimination based on race and gender
Context
Uncertainty Description: Degree to which future environment is known/fixed
Low: Continued existence of constitutional monarchy/democracy
High: Status of United Kingdom within the European Union
Interconnectedness Description: Degree to which environment is interrelated/coordinated
Low: New and emergent industries (e.g. online media providers)
High: Long established and regulated industries (e.g. print media)
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thematic choices’’; and that such orders are always ‘‘sub-
jected… [to] rules of formation’’ that amount to a sort of
power-knowledge me´lange (also see Foucault 1977,
pp. 23–25). As a result, the negative perspective suggests
that, whatever their posited intentions, multi-stakeholder
initiatives comprise a type of scientific and (soft) legal
‘‘complex’’ (Foucault 1977, p. 23) that can never be free
from power relations; and thus, are always marked by a
form of communicative and/or exclusionary ‘violence’
(Blowfield 2005, p. 182). More generally, the negative
perspective tends toward suggesting that CSR, and a vari-
ety of its more or less closely related conceptual counter-
parts (e.g. environmental management, sustainable
development), comprise a power–knowledge complex that
emphasizes the responsibility of society towards corpora-
tions more than it does the responsibilities of corporations
towards society (e.g. Banerjee 2008).
As I have already indicated, an important upshot of
these Gramscian and Foucauldian insights is that they
result in the negative view portraying the various mani-
festations of consensual CSR—e.g. multi-stakeholder ini-
tiatives, CSR reporting, environmental management
programmes—in a fashion resembling Oliver’s (1991)
strategies of compromise and avoid. Prasad and Elmes
(2005, p. 863) for example, write that:
…practical [environmental management] is equated
with maintaining economic growth and success…
[with] entering into alliances and agreements with
specific stakeholders and ensuring low levels of
societal confrontation. [Accordingly, environmental
management] ultimately appears to rest on a narrow
platform of economic instrumentality and on a phi-
losophy of convenience that emphasizes minimum
socio-economic disruption and maximum conflict
avoidance… it frequently falls short in terms of
conserving natural resources or reducing industrial
pollution, while simultaneously excluding other
environmental discourses… on the grounds that they
are not practical enough.
Similarly, Blowfield (2005, pp. 181–182) suggests that
CSR discourse portrays ‘‘success as something non-con-
flictual’’, ‘‘views dissent as a perversion’’, and ‘‘treats con-
flict as something that can be avoided through inclusive
stakeholder partnerships’’. Amongst other things then, the
negative perspective of consensual CSR suggests that both
the social accounting practices of corporations (Spence
2009), and their participation within international account-
ability standards (Jamali 2010), will tend to be ‘ceremonial’.
To briefly expand, it suggests that whilst consensual CSR
practices will often be characterized by some sort of com-
promise between corporations and their stakeholders, any
compromise that is reached will either have a financial
benefit (or be of no significant cost) for a corporation; or be
constructed so as to ensure that corporate practices are
‘‘buffered’’ or ‘‘de-coupled’’ (Oliver 1991, pp. 154–155;
Meyer and Rowan 1977) from any costs that such a com-
promise would otherwise entail. In contrast to the positive
perspective then, which portrays multi-stakeholder initia-
tives like the Forest Stewardship Council, SA 8000, and the
United Nations Global Compact, in terms of corporations
acquiescing to and/or compromising over stakeholder
demands; the negative perspective suggests they are char-
acterized by a process of compromise and/or avoid. To put it
metaphorically, the positive perspective of consensual CSR
sees the ‘glass’ of multi-stakeholder initiatives as half-full,
whilst the negative perspective sees it as half-empty.
Table 2 Strategic responses
Developed with reference to
Oliver (1991)
Strategies (and tactics) Description
Acquiesce
Habit/imitate Follow invisible, tacit norms
Comply Obey/accept norms advanced by stakeholders
Compromise
Balance Balance corporate and stakeholder interests
Pacify Placate and accommodate external interests/stakeholders
Avoid
Conceal Disguise nonconformity with stakeholder supported norms
Buffer ‘De-couple’ corporate practices from professed norms
Defy
Challenge Contest external norms and/or stakeholders
Attack Attack or undermine external norms and/or stakeholders
Manipulate
Influence Shape interest of external constituents/stakeholders
Control Dominate/control constituents/stakeholders
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Dissensual Corporate Social Responsibility
In conceiving dissensual CSR, I begin with four points
regarding dissensus more generally. First, issues of dissent
(or consent) will often relate to theoretical/cognitive
frameworks (i.e. matters of conception); pragmatic/instru-
mental considerations (i.e. means-end relations); and/or,
axiological/normative issues (i.e. value issues) (Rescher
1993, p. 5; cf. Suchman 1995, pp. 578–586). Accordingly,
issues of dissent (or consent) can be more or less complex
(e.g. they can relate to one or more of a given set of nor-
mative, cognitive and pragmatic questions). Furthermore,
they can be more or less pronounced (e.g. value disagree-
ments tend to be ‘deeper’ than pragmatic disagreements).
Second, disagreement, discordance, and/or dissensus, is
a fact of life. Rescher (1993, p. 67) for instance, argues that
because experience differs ‘‘from age to age, culture to
culture, and… person to person… pluralism… is an
unavoidable part of the natural scheme of things’’ (Rescher
1993, p. 67). As a result—and in contrast to the oft made
suggestion that institutions should be designed to enable
the formation of consensus (e.g. Habermas 1996; O’Neill
1989)—it is also commonly suggested that institutions
should be designed to account for a world marked by
continuing disagreements (e.g. Rescher 1993, Chapters
8–10). Rawls (1999) for example has suggested, with this
and other concerns in mind, that the international order
should be respectful of ‘reasonable’ differences in social/
political orders within different nation-states; and that a
liberal domestic order should be respectful of ‘reasonable’
differences in belief systems amongst its different domestic
communities.
Third, not only is dissensus a fact of life, but it can be
conceived as a pragmatic and/or normative positive. Pro-
gress in science for example (e.g. Kuhn 1996), and pro-
gress in our normative values (Mill 1859), is often posited
to arise through dissenting, revolutionary, and not infre-
quently persecuted, voices. Furthermore, it is often sug-
gested that dissenting voices can help reveal the limits of
our cognitive and/or normative frameworks (e.g. Laclau
and Mouffe 1985), and that they can help to reveal possi-
bilities and ‘‘obliterated wrongs that cannot be signified
within a hegemonic discourse’’ (Ziarek 2001, p. 86). In
Foucauldian terms then, it might be suggested that dis-
sensus, antagonism, and/or polemics (cf. Foucault 1984b),
can help mobilize those ‘‘points of resistance’’ that make
(personal and social) revolutions possible (Foucault 1978,
pp. 96–97).
Fourth, and whilst the ideas of dissensus and consensus
are analytically separate, they need not be considered
mutually exclusive or sequentially unrelated. Positions that
currently dissent against a more or less widespread con-
sensus, for instance, can subsequently go on to be the
subject thereof (e.g. Kuhn 1996; Mill 1859). And, it is
obviously possible for people to agree that dissent will
sometimes be socially desirable (e.g. the right to public
protest); or, for people to consent to the suggestion that
dissent should be allowed on various issues (e.g. matters of
taste).
As these four points indicate, the idea of CSR—which
relates to the management of the business–society interface
and to normative and/or ‘social good’ issues (e.g. Gond and
Moon 2011)—can be meaningfully related to the notion of
dissensus. Accordingly, dissensual CSR should not be
considered oxymoronic, but rather, as a possible alternative
or supplement to the widely actualized consensual CSR
activities outlined above.
To further clarify the differences separating dissensual
from consensual CSR, the most general point to make is
that, whereas consensual CSR seeks to organize and/or
portray corporate-civil society accordance; dissensual CSR
seeks to organize and/or portray corporate-civil society
discordance. More pointedly—and rather than being asso-
ciated with the corporate concern to: (a) comply with or
balance stakeholder demands (i.e. the positive perspective
of consensual CSR); or (b) pacify or buffer themselves
from stakeholder demands (i.e. the negative perspective of
consensual CSR)—dissensual CSR is associated with the
corporate concern to actively seek out, acknowledge, and/
or publicize, some sort of corporate-civil society dis-
agreement. Thus, and as Table 3 highlights, dissensual
CSR is better associated with Oliver’s (1991) defy strategy
than it is her strategies of acquiesce, compromise or avoid.
Additionally, and whereas the positive perspective of
consensual CSR in particular, suggests that the legitimacy
of corporate practices depends on their being widely con-
sented to; dissensual CSR suggests that the opposite may
also be true. Indeed, a cognitive elitist with pragmatic and/
or normative intentions might suggest that it is because a
corporation’s activities differ from what the masses con-
sider legitimate, that they deserve respect (Rescher 1993,
p. 30).
Be this as it may, the more important point to emphasize
is that, if corporations are to engage in dissensual CSR,
then they need to engage more radical than reformative
civil society actors: for whereas the latter seek compro-
mise, the former do not (den Hond and de Bakker 2007). A
reformative NGO like the World Wildlife Fund (WWF),
for example—which seeks to ‘‘build strong partnerships
with business’’—is unlikely to engage in any meaningful
corporate confrontation. A more radical NGO such as
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA), on
the other hand, provides a much more suitable option.
Indeed, given their ‘‘uncompromising stands on animal
rights’’, and their ‘‘driving mission… to stop animal abuse
worldwide’’, PETA are more or less completely opposed to
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a whole host of corporate activities (e.g. animal slaughter
by fast food retailers). In much the same fashion, more
radical or ‘deep’ environmentalists (e.g. Naess 1973) pro-
vide a good corporate opponent due to their scepticism of
capitalist enterprise more generally (cf. Melucci 1996).
Dissent Enabling Public Spheres
I now suggest that dissent enabling public spheres provide
one, and perhaps the most suitable means, by which a
corporation can concretely realize dissensual CSR. In
addition to being helpfully contrasted with the above dis-
cussed multi-stakeholder initiatives, which can be consid-
ered a sort of ‘consent oriented public sphere’; what I term
‘dissent enabling public spheres’ are helpfully conceived as
an ‘‘assemblage’’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1988, p. 37) of
certain ideas discussed by Habermas and Foucault. In light
of such—and given that Habermas and Foucault are com-
monly (and not unreasonably) posited as being theoretical
opposites (e.g. Scherer and Palazzo 2007, p. 1097)—I
begin with a clarification.
Specifically, I note that whilst the works of Habermas
and Foucault are opposable—in that the former is largely
concerned with universal rationality (e.g. Habermas 1990)
and the latter with historical rationalities (e.g. Foucault
1972)—the two need not be considered mutually exclusive.
Indeed, Habermas (1986) has suggested that Foucault was
ultimately ‘pulled back’ into the same modern philosoph-
ical tradition that he himself occupies; and Foucault
(1984c, pp. 248–249) that whilst he and Habermas
explored different questions, he was ‘‘completely in
agreement’’ with Habermas’s belief ‘‘that if one abandons
the work of Kant… for example, we run the risk of lapsing
into irrationality’’.
With that clarified—and given that the broader projects
of Habermas and Foucault are widely discussed in con-
siderable detail throughout the humanities and social sci-
ences (e.g. Gutting 1994; Heath 2001)—I now turn to the
specific task of conceiving dissent oriented public spheres.
I emphasize four points in doing so. First, I note that I
appropriate Habermas’s (1989) idea of the public sphere
because it helpfully describes communications that are
more or less widely accessible to, and potentially partici-
pated in by, variable parties.
Second, I highlight that in The Structural Transforma-
tion of the Public Sphere (1989), Habermas famously
documents the manner in which commercially oriented
actors—i.e. coffee houses and newspapers—helped con-
struct the public sphere(s) within which norms of social
integration became freely debated within the UK, and
subsequently elsewhere (e.g. France), from the mid-sev-
enteenth century onwards. Accordingly, it is not much of a
conceptual leap to suggest that businesses can also play a
role in the creation of contemporary and dissent enabling
public spheres.
Third, I emphasize that dissent enabling public spheres
are not necessarily consistent with the general tenor of
Habermas’s work. In particular, I note that whereas Hab-
ermas tends to suggest that public spheres should be
arranged to ensure that the ‘‘force of the better argument’’
will enable all parties to reach a rational agreement (e.g.
Habermas 1996, p. 103); the notion I am conceiving sug-
gests that public spheres can also be arranged to highlight
existing or potential points of disagreement. Furthermore, I
note that dissent enabling public spheres do not have to
‘‘provide for an acquiescence in disagreement’’ (Rescher
1993, p. 158). Indeed, they could potentially lead to a
further escalation of conflict.
Table 3 Differentiating consensual from dissensual corporate social responsibility
Consensual CSR Dissensual CSR
Positive or negative view Positive Negative NA
General orientation Corporate-civil society consensus Corporate-civil society consensus Corporate-civil society
dissensus
Strategies Acquiesce–compromise Compromise–avoid Defy
Tactics Comply, balance Pacify, conceal, buffer Challenge, attack
Concrete CSR Practices
and/or Initiatives
associated with
(non-exhaustive list)
Forest Stewardship Council (Scherer
and Palazzo 2007); SA 8000 (Gilbert
and Rasche 2007); United Nations
Global Compact (Scherer and
Palazzo 2011); ‘Discursive
Engagement’ and/or ‘Deliberative
Democracy’ (Gilbert and Rasche
2007; Scherer and Palazzo 2011)
Forest Stewardship Council
(Blowfield 2005); SA 8000
(Jamali 2010); United Nations Global
Compact (Jamali 2010); ‘Environmental
Management’ (Prasad and Elmes 2005);
‘Social Accounting’ (Spence 2009);
‘Stakeholder Engagement’ (Blowfield 2005)
Dissent enabling public
spheres
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Finally, I argue that, by enabling the emergence of
discordance and/or conflict, dissent enabling public spheres
can help to negatively and positively reveal the extent to
which ‘‘relations of communications’’ are largely insepa-
rable from ‘‘relations of power’’ (Foucault 1987, p. 18). In
terms of their negative revelatory potential then, I suggest
that dissent enabling public spheres and/or CSR practices
can help highlight the extent to which consent oriented
public spheres and/or CSR practices—e.g. the multi-
stakeholder initiatives described above—tend towards the
exclusion of ‘irrational’ or ‘impractical’ voices (e.g.
Blowfield 2005; Prasad and Elmes 2005). And in terms of
their positive revelatory potential, I suggest that dissent
enabling public spheres and/or CSR practices can help
those who are ‘silenced’ by consent-oriented public spheres
and/or CSR practices to positively ‘voice’ their own posi-
tions. Importantly in this last regard, I am not suggesting
that dissent enabling public spheres would enable ‘‘rela-
tions of power’’ to be ‘‘dissolve[d]… in the utopia of a
perfectly transparent communication’’. Rather, I am sug-
gesting that they ‘‘allow these games… to be played with a
minimum of domination’’ (Foucault 1987, p. 18).
To bring the discussion of this and the preceding section
to a close, I emphasize that whilst I have touched on var-
ious normative issues, I have been primarily concerned to
conceptually differentiate consensual and dissensual CSR.
In particular, I have noted that consensual CSR can be
associated with multi-stakeholder initiatives that (ostensi-
bly) seek to align or balance corporate- and civil-society
interests for normative and/or pragmatic reasons. On the
other hand, I have suggested that dissent enabling public
spheres—e.g. multi-stakeholder initiatives that seek to
organize or publicize corporate-civil society discordance—
provide a specific means by which corporations can engage
in dissensual CSR.
With these distinctions made, I now suggest that cor-
porations (and/or managers) can choose to engage in either
consensual or dissensual CSR at a given point in time.
More specifically, I outline why I consider an economic
actor-centred institutional perspective particularly well
suited to explaining CSR activities at the corporate level.
An Economic Actor-Centred Institutional Perspective
Within the management literature, (neo-)institutional theory
tends to emphasize the environment over the actors within it
(Kostova et al. 2008); and/or, a class of actors over the
individuals of which it is comprised (e.g. Greenwood and
Hinings 1996, p. 1026). In short, contemporary institutional
theorists tend to suggest that individual actors—be they
persons or corporations—are inclined to unthinkingly or
isomorphically acquiesce to existing roles or ideals; and/or,
to deliberately imitate external practices, or act upon external
demands, in an effort to improve their chances of being
perceived as legitimate and/or suitable for a given task
(Oliver 1991, pp. 152–153). More generally, institutional
theorists tend to suggest that there are overlapping and taken
for granted background norms or conditions that signifi-
cantly enable various forms of social interaction.
Although (neo-)institutional theory enjoys considerable
popularity within the management studies literature, it is
commonly critiqued for understating the extent to which
different agents respond to similar (but variable and often
competing) institutional pressures, in different ways.
Indeed, there now exists a considerable (and diverse) lit-
erature that seeks to redress this imbalance: e.g. through the
idea of institutional entrepreneurship (e.g. Levy and Scully
2007), or through combining institutional and resource
dependency theories (e.g. Oliver 1991). In contributing to
this broad line of thought, I suggest that the idea of an
actor-centred institutional perspective is particularly useful.
I distinguish four types.
What I term a sociological actor-centred institutional
perspective has recently been outlined by Aguilera and
Jackson (2010: 532). Of the four perspectives here
described, it is the most closely related to conventional
institutional theory: for it emphasizes that different actors
are socially embedded and/or influenced, and that their
identities and/or interests are internally shaped by their
external institutional environments. Amongst other things
then, the sociological perspective suggests that different
individuals will react to similar institutional pressures in
different ways due to their possessing different, sociolog-
ically informed, identities and interests.
An ethical actor-centred institutional perspective, on the
other hand, emphasizes that individuals can use their
independent reasoning capacities to determine whether or
not they should comply with, resist, or seek to transform,
various institutional pressures. Thus, and whilst these dif-
ferent actors may or may not form their understanding
through communicative acts (Habermas 1990), the key
point to emphasize is that individual ethical (and/or moral)
actors (cf. Habermas 1995, pp. 112, 126) can themselves
decide how to respond to different institutional pressures
(e.g. those relating to abstinence from alcohol, marital
fidelity, meat eating) on the basis of normative reasoning.
The transformative perspective is the third actor-centred
perspective. It draws on elements of the sociological and
ethical perspectives without being reducible to either.
Specifically, it involves a person using a sort of ethical
agency to transform their already existent, and sociologi-
cally informed, actor-hood. The person involved, however,
does not use their ‘ethical’ agency out of a concern to
comply with existing norms. Rather, they use it in an effort
to (continuously) transgress and transform their own ways
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of being (Foucault 1984a, pp. 45–47). Arguably, this
transformative actor-centred institutionalism is the most
agentic of all the perspectives here outlined. Neverthe-
less—and whereas it may have considerable relevance for
the analysis of those involved in deep philosophical
investigations, radically transgressive behaviours, and/or
new social movements (e.g. Melucci 1996)—it arguably
has the least immediate relevance to decision making
within corporations.
By way of contrast, what I term the economic actor-
centred institutional perspective is applicable to a whole
host of decision making complexes within corporations. In
short, this fourth perspective suggests that corporate man-
agers make decisions on the basis of pragmatic strategic
considerations: e.g. ‘profit-maximization’. This ‘self-
interested’ understanding of actor-hood is commonly
employed, in slight variations, throughout the social sci-
ences. In political science (Downs 1957) and international
relations (Moravcsik 2000) for instance, the concern with
profits tends to be replaced or supplemented with the
concern to seize or maintain power.
Importantly, an economic actor-centred institutional
perspective can overlap with the sociological and ethical
perspectives (and perhaps the transformative perspective as
well). Various sociological and/or political factors for
instance—e.g. business school educations (Ghoshal and
Moran 2005) and corporate governance structures (Sealy
and Worthington 2008)—contribute to corporate managers
commonly conceiving of corporate profitability as being
important. Further, it is likely that some managers focus on
corporate profitability because they think it is ethically
correct for one reason or another (see Heath and Norman
2004 for some possible justifications in this regard). In
short, and as casual empirical analysis confirms (of CSR
websites, reports and practices for instance), an economic
actor-centred institutionalism is an expedient and empiri-
cally realistic theoretical option for explaining CSR poli-
cies at practices at the corporate level.
More specifically, and as I have already indicated above, I
suggest that an economic perspective is helpful due to it
suggesting that managers will be inclined to adopt dissensual
over consensual CSR when they believe that defiance of civil
society pressures is likely to prove more profitable than the
use of acquiesce, compromise and/or avoid strategies with
regard thereto (Oliver 1991). In this specific fashion then,
and as Table 4 clarifies, the economic perspective differs
from the other three actor-centred institutional perspectives
(which themselves differ from each other).
Shell and the Construction of a Dissent Enabling Public
Sphere
As institutional theory suggests, the emergence and wide-
spread adoption of consensual CSR practices can be
understood as relating to institutional pressures at two
levels of analysis. First, and most immediately, it relates to
the ‘direct’ pressures that corporations face with regard to
improving their moral and/or social performance. Second,
and somewhat more generally, it relates to the pressures
that corporations face to engage in consensual CSR activ-
ities as a form or style of practice (e.g. Blowfield 2005;
Shanahan and Khagram 2006).
Whilst these pressures undoubtedly contribute to the
widespread proliferation of consensual CSR, the general
point made in the preceding section is that actors possess
an agency that need not result in their being acquiesced to
(and/or isomorphically adopted). More specifically, I have
argued that an economic actor-centred institutional per-
spective suggests that corporate managers will be inclined
Table 4 Four actor-centred institutional explanations of consensual and dissensual CSR
Actor-centred
institutional perspective
Explanation of the adoption of
Consensual CSR Dissensual CSR
Sociological Cultural and/or professional interest/identity that
emphasizes need for interest alignment between
corporations and civil society. A more democratic
than liberal disposition
Cultural and/or professional interest/identity that
emphasizes the need for corporate-civil society
discordance to be publicized or enabled. A more
liberal than democratic disposition
Ethical Managerial belief that corporate-civil society
agreement needs to be maintained or constructed
to ensure moral legitimacy of corporate practices
Managerial belief that the enabling or promotion of
corporate-civil society discordance is morally
correct: e.g. because it promotes social progress
Transformative Manager fails to ‘free’ themselves from
conventional and consent privileging CSR role/
discourse
Manager ‘frees’ themselves from conventional CSR
role/discourse to create a new dissent enabling
function
Economic Managerial belief that profitability is most likely to
be achieved by acquiescing to, compromising
over, or avoiding, civil society pressures
Managerial belief that profitability is most likely to
be achieved by defying civil society pressures
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to adopt dissensual over consensual CSR practices, in a
given specific instance, so long as they believe that the
former is the financially prudent, or most beneficial, option.
It is in illustrating this basic line of argument, then, that I
now analyse a dissent enabling public sphere that Shell has
recently constructed.
Shell, Brent Spar and Corporate Social Responsibility
Shell is an Anglo-Dutch petro-giant who commonly ranks
amongst the world’s top ten companies in terms of revenues.
The majority of their earnings are made ‘upstream’ in fossil
fuels: i.e. in the search and recovery of oil and natural gas, the
liquification and transportation of gas, and the operation of the
infrastructure required to deliver oil and gas to market. Nev-
ertheless, Shell also generates at least some minimal income
from various renewables such as biofuels and wind. Further-
more, they often express a broad commitment to environ-
mental responsibility and/or sustainable development, and to
being concerned with climate change (Shell 2012).
Given the nature of their operations, Shell are often
subject to critique from civil society actors. Radical envi-
ronmental activists for example, regularly target Shell in
their various campaigning activities. Perhaps most memo-
rably, Greenpeace vanquished Shell in the Brent Spar
‘battle’ of 1995 (e.g. Bakir 2005; Grolin 1998; Tsoukas
1999). This battle was a public relations disaster that
contributed, amongst other things, to the fire-bombing of
two Shell outlets in Germany (Tsoukas 1999, p. 515). More
importantly, the campaign—which received significant
media attention, and involved Greenpeace activists occu-
pying the Brent Spar oil buoy (an oil storage device)—
resulted in Shell abandoning their plans to sink the oil buoy
in the North Atlantic; and to their towing it to Norway,
where parts of it were used to help construct an industrial
quayside (Bennie 1998, p. 397).
Since the Brent Spar episode, Shell has undergone major
reviews of their CSR and communicative practices (e.g.
Coupland and Brown 2004). Most importantly in the
present context, they created Shell Dialogues (in 1998) as a
means by which to work ‘‘with a number of media or-
ganisations around the world to produce events, articles
and broadcasts so our key stakeholders can debate the
burning issues’’ (Shell Dialogues). The 2009 ‘BBC World
Debate’ on ‘The Future of Fossil Fuels’ that Shell produced
in association with BBC World News, is one example of a
Shell Dialogues event.
Shell’s BBC World Debate: ‘The Future of Fossil
Fuels’
To give an indication as to the potential ‘reach’ of this
specific debate, I note that BBC World News, the
‘‘commercially funded, international’’ arm of the BBC,
broadcasts ‘‘in English in more than 200 countries and
territories across the globe’’ to an ‘‘estimated weekly
audience reach of 74 million’’ (BBCWN). Further, I note
that the debate was televised prior to the 2009 United
Nations Copenhagen Climate Change Conference, where it
was hoped that world leaders would reach agreement on
reducing CO2 (equivalent) emissions (see COP15 2009).
The debate itself featured the following parties: Emily
Rochon from Greenpeace International; John Mills from
Shell; Neil Hirst from the International Energy Agency;
Heleen de Coninck, from the Energy Research Centre of
the Netherlands; and Chris Schroeder from Qatar Airways.
As emerged during the debate, and as detailed in Table 5
below, various differences separated the five panellists.
Most importantly, the debate revealed an effective chasm
between the positions held by Greenpeace’s Emily Rochon
and Shell’s John Mills on such issues as energy demand
levels in 2050–2060; fossil fuel requirements in
2050–2060; and carbon capture and storage (CCS) tech-
nology (a technology which first ‘captures’ carbon from
fossil fuel power plants, and then injects the carbon into the
earth’s geo-structure).
In general terms, the debate revealed significant differ-
ences on both theoretical/cognitive matters (e.g. with
regard to predicted energy demand levels) and pragmatic/
instrumental considerations (e.g. with regard to the work-
ability of alternative energy technologies as opposed to
CCS). On the other hand, the debate did not reveal any
significant differences with regard to axiological/normative
issues. Indeed, the debate was founded on a consensus
regarding the need to reduce CO2 (equivalent) emissions,
and that climate change is undesirable more generally.
Given that the debate itself was largely ‘silent’ on value
issues, it is important to emphasize that Shell and Green-
peace can be characterized in terms of underlying value
differences. With regard to Shell then, it is fairly clear that,
as one of the world’s largest and most recognizable cor-
porations, it is predisposed towards recognizing the merits
of capitalism in its various (state and market) guises.
Greenpeace, on the other hand, is an ‘‘independent global
campaigning organisation’’ that seeks ‘‘to protect and
conserve the environment’’; does ‘‘not accept donations
from governments or corporations’’; and that ‘‘chal-
lenge[s] government and corporations when they fail to
live up to their mandate to safeguard our environment and
our future’’ (GI). Thus—and whilst Greenpeace profess to
‘‘have no permanent allies or enemies’’, and does lend
support to various consent oriented CSR initiatives (GI)—it
is far from being pro-capitalism (e.g. Naidoo 2009).
The question that needs to be answered, then, is why
would Shell construct a public sphere that enables Green-
peace to voice opinions that so clearly disagree with their
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own? An economic actor-centred institutional perspective
points towards three (overlapping) explanations. First, the
fact that Greenpeace vanquished Shell in the Brent Spar
‘battle’ of 1995—which was ostensibly over the best
method by which to dispose of an oil buoy (i.e. a theo-
retical and/or pragmatic question)—means that Shell are
well aware that the failure to confront the theoretical and/or
pragmatic beliefs of radical NGO voices can result in
commercial damage. Accordingly, they appear to have
decided that it was better, in this specific instance, to bring
these theoretical and pragmatic differences to the fore;
rather than wait for Greenpeace to do it for them. In other
words, Shell took partial control of the way in which their
own reasoning was represented, whilst simultaneously
managing to acknowledge Greenpeace’s differing point of
view (which Greenpeace was communicating, and still is
communicating, by their own independent means).
Second, the idea that fossil fuels will only be needed to a
minimal extent by 2050–2060, a position advanced by
Greenpeace, is inimical to Shell’s core business operations,
and thus, one that Shell cannot acquiesce to or easily
compromise over within a consensual CSR framework.
Shell, however, still faces the risk that Greenpeace might
prove capable of convincing a variety of powerful stake-
holders, such as governments and/or consumers for
instance, that their position is feasible and desirable (as
they partially did in the case of Brent Spar). Accordingly,
Shell’s decision to construct a public sphere within which
Greenpeace could publicly express, and Shell could pub-
licly disagree with, their claims, makes general sense.
Importantly, and as Table 5 summarizes, Shell’s belief that
fossil fuels will still be needed to some considerable extent
in 2050–2060, was broadly agreed to by all the participants
except Greenpeace. In this fashion then, the dissent
enabling public sphere actually points towards a partial
(but not necessarily stable) consensus.
Third, Greenpeace’s suggestion that CCS technology is
unlikely to work in the short- to medium-term future is not
only a potentially significant hindrance to Shell’s exiting
fossil fuels business (which arguably depends on the
world’s capacity to reduce CO2 emissions), but also to a
potentially lucrative new one. The basic reason being that,
in addition to requiring that CO2 emissions be captured (by
chemicals for example), and subsequently stored under-
ground (e.g. in depleted oil and gas reservoirs), CCS
involves the replacement of a ‘‘coal-fired plant with a gas-
fired plant that has CCS’’ technology and that can poten-
tially ‘‘cut CO2 emissions by up to 90 %’’ (Shell). Indeed,
the International Energy Agency suggests that ‘‘CCS…
could contribute as much as 19 % of the CO2 mitigation
Table 5 Positions advanced during ‘the future of fossil fuels’ debate
Participant,
affiliation
Can fossil
fuels be
clean and
green?
Can carbon
capture work at
scale?
Can energy demands
in 2050–2060 be
limited to today’s
levels?
Can fossil fuels be
effectively phased out by
2050–2060
General points
Emily Rochon,
Greenpeace
Absolutely
not
Potentially in the
longer term
(20 years).
Currently
unproven
Yes, via the judicious
employment of
efficiency measures
Yes, renewable resources,
and alternative energy
technologies, can supply
what the world needs
Emissions need to peak globally
between now and 2015. Coal
cannot play a significant role if
this goal is to be achieved
John Mills, Shell Can and
need to
be
greener
Yes, in the short–
medium term
(from 2012
onwards)
No, they will double
due to population
and per-capita
consumption
increases
No, they will still be
required to meet approx.
two-thirds of energy
demands
Coal power stations are being built
globally and will increasingly be
built in transition economies:
e.g. China
Neil Hirst,
International
Energy Agency
Can and
need to
be
greener
Yes, in the short–
medium term
Unlikely Partially. There will need
to be a mix of energy
sources to meet demand
We need to be committing
resources to multiple and various
technologies
Heleen de
Coninck,
Energy
Research Centre
of the
Netherlands
No Yes, in the short–
medium term
NA Partially. There will need
to be a mix of energy
sources to meet demand
Development of technologies like
carbon capture will require
considerable resources and
political will
Chris Schroeder,
Qatar Airways
No NA Unlikely Fossil fuels only option for
the foreseeable future in
aviation industry
Don’t want to rely on fossil fuels.
If other technologies are
available, would willingly use
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effort required by 2050’’ (Shell 2012, p. 50). With these
points in mind, then, CCS can be considered a potential
‘double-win’ for Shell: for the company is well placed to
help make CCS work in the first place, and can also supply
natural gas to the new gas-fired power plants that would
subsequently be needed (Shell 2012, p. 50). Nevertheless,
and as Greenpeace’s Emily Rochon makes clear in the
debate, currently working CCS initiatives amount to
approximately 1/6000th of that which the International
Energy Agency suggests is needed to tackle climate
change. Thus, and whilst there is some obvious potential
upside to Shell’s highlighting the possibilities of CCS,
there is also some potentially considerable downside if they
were to place too much emphasis upon it.
Discussion
The first point to make in discussing ‘The Future of Fossil
Fuels Debate’ is that the economic actor-centred institu-
tional perspective I have utilized provides a different
explanation to those that either the sociological or ethical
perspectives would likely provide. Specifically, the former
would be inclined to explain these dissensual CSR activi-
ties with reference to the changing identities and/or inter-
ests of Shell decision-makers; and the later with reference
to their processes of normative reasoning. By way of
contrast, the economic perspective suggests that the reason
for Shell decision-makers employing dissensual CSR in
this specific instance, is because they thought a defy
strategy more prudent than a strategy of acquiesce, com-
promise, and/or avoid.
The employment of such dissensual CSR practices,
however, comes with considerable risks. Specifically, and
as I have just indicated in noting that CCS remains in its
practical infancy, the debate could potentially contribute to
key stakeholders (e.g. politicians) believing that climate
change cannot be managed by such means. Rather, it might
result in them thinking that it requires significant reduc-
tions in fossil fuels usage. Thus, instead of encouraging
government support for the continued viability of fossil
fuels and the development of CCS technologies, which
Shell (2012, pp. 50–51) publicly advocate, the debate
might contribute to pressures moving in the other direction.
Clearly, this is something that Greenpeace would wel-
come, and was no doubt the reason for Greenpeace’s Emily
Rochon participating in the debate in the first place.
However, and just as Shell face risks through constructing
the dissent enabling public sphere, Greenpeace face risks
participating within it. Most pointedly, Greenpeace run the
risk of being positively marginalized (as opposed to neg-
atively marginalized in the sense indicated by the negative
perspective on consensual CSR). In particular, I note that,
by suggesting that the world’s reliance on fossil fuels can
effectively be phased out by 2050–2060, Greenpeace was
the clear outlier in ‘The Future of Fossil Fuels’ debate.
Further, by using the debate to make statements such as—
‘‘if our priority is climate change, you cannot continue to
increase our reliance on fossil fuel’’—Emily Rochon might
be perceived as suggesting that Greenpeace is not overly
concerned with such issues as energy security and cost. In
short, Greenpeace run the risk of portraying themselves as
impractical.
Whilst there are potential risks to both Shell and
Greenpeace from constructing and/or participating within
such a dissent enabling public sphere, I suggest that, given
the right circumstances, both parties would likely construct
and/or participate within one again. The general reason
why is that, unlike consensual CSR, dissensual CSR
enables corporations and more radical civil society actors
to confront each other over issues of fundamental com-
mercial importance (in ways that do not involve direct
physical violence). Interestingly, even when there is a
‘loser’ from the immediate confrontation, this ‘loser’ can
still be perceived to have benefitted from the confrontation.
Greenpeace for example, who might be perceived to have
lost certain key aspects of ‘The Future of Fossil Fuels
Debate’, are likely to have strengthened their radical cre-
dentials in the eyes of some because of their refusal to be
‘practical’ and seek to ‘win’ the debate. By way of contrast,
if they were to be the ‘loser’ within a consensual CSR
initiative, then they run the risk of being perceived to have
lost in two senses: for not only have they compromised
‘more’ than their corporate partner, but they also had to
agree to compromise or ‘sell out’ in the first place.
In addition to being of potential benefit to the various
participants within them, it is possible to identify at least
four (competing) reasons for thinking that dissent enabling
public spheres can contribute to the social good more
generally. First, the voicing of dissent might contribute to
the formation of a broader and stronger consensus on the
specific issues discussed further down the line. It is pos-
sible, for example, that either Shell or Greenpeace, or those
who support them, will ultimately come round to the oth-
er’s view in a socially progressive fashion. As noted above,
this sort of progressive possibility of dissent has long been
recognized (e.g. Mill 1859; cf. Rescher 1993, p. 46).
A conservative argument, on the other hand, might
suggest that dissent enabling public spheres help demon-
strate that ‘moralizing’ is inconsistent with the functional
operation of sub-systems in modern societies (e.g. markets;
judiciaries); and that they can thus act to strengthen com-
munity support for such sub-systems operating free there
from (Luhman 1993). More specifically, through high-
lighting more radical ‘moralizing’ voices, dissent enabling
public spheres might encourage the general public to
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question whether or not corporations should even entertain
the more reformative ‘moralizing’ voices that are associ-
ated with consensual CSR (e.g. Willke and Willke 2008).
In a slightly different fashion, it might be suggested that
dissent enabling public spheres are socially beneficial
because they encompass and demonstrate the reality of
social difference. Amongst other things, this plural per-
spective suggests that dissent enabling public spheres can
help to reveal that a social consensus is highly unlikely on
certain issues, not needed on certain issues, and/or, that the
effort to achieve a specific consensus is not worthwhile. In
short, it might help society acknowledge that social har-
mony is not so much a matter of consensus, as it is a matter
of agreeing to ‘‘‘live and let live’, so that we avoid letting
our differences become a causus beli between us’’ (Rescher
1993, p. 132). Whilst this perspective is likely to be con-
sidered overly passive by many (e.g. supporters of con-
sensual CSR), it might be considered very suitable by
others: e.g. by multinational corporations seeking to man-
age their complex moral environment around the globe.
Finally, a transformative perspective suggests that cor-
porate constructed and dissent oriented public spheres are
of social value due to their potentially leading to some sort
of revolutionary change. Someone might, for example,
think that the confrontation between Shell and Greenpeace
is the upshot of both their underpinning worldviews being
‘mistaken’ (for potentially much the same reason); and thus
seek an alternative worldview that does not suffer the same
problems. Importantly, the transformative perspective of
which I am thinking is less dialectical and rational than it is
creative and esoteric. It promises the possibility of societies
being partially redesigned anew in ways that can only be
recognized ex post facto (e.g. Foucault 1984a).
Conclusion
In the present paper I have made three key contributions.
First, I have noted the consensual tendencies of the CSR
literature more generally, and conceived of both a positive
and negative perspective of consensual CSR in non-nor-
mative terms. Second, I have conceived of dissensual CSR,
and argued that dissent enabling public spheres are a pri-
mary means by which corporations can actualize dissensual
CSR practices. Third, I have differentiated between four
actor-centred institutional perspectives, and argued that an
economic actor-centred institutional perspective is partic-
ularly well suited to the analysis of CSR at the corporate
level. Additionally, I have used this economic perspective
to analyse a dissent enabling public sphere that Shell has
recently constructed.
Further to making these contributions, the paper sug-
gests at least four topics that scholars interested in business
and society interactions might pursue in future research.
First, and most obviously, there is more work needed with
regard to identifying and investigating other examples of
dissensual CSR. As I have indicated throughout the paper,
consensual CSR is the status quo with regard to both CSR
practice and scholarship. Nevertheless, corporations other
than Shell—such as E.ON UK—have engaged in dissen-
sual CSR practices, and have helped construct a form of
dissent enabling public sphere (E.ON Talking Energy).
Accordingly, it would be interesting for future work to
identify and analytically differentiate the various dissen-
sual CSR policies and practices that are possible or cur-
rently actualized; and/or, to further explain why such
dissensual CSR practices are chosen over, or are likely to
be chosen over, their consensual counterpart.
Second, there is a need for work that investigates the
normative underpinnings of dissensual CSR, and that
compares and contrasts these underpinnings with those of
consensual CSR. As noted in the paper’s introduction, I
have here engaged in descriptive–explanatory theorizing,
and not normative–prescriptive theorizing. Thus, and
whilst I have necessarily discussed various normative
issues throughout the paper, these discussions are no more
than a beginning. Accordingly, I suggest that one or more
of the four ‘social good’ perspectives that I have above
outlined on dissensual CSR—i.e. the progressive, conser-
vative, plural, and transformative perspective, respec-
tively—could provide a good starting point from which to
proceed.
Third, it would be interesting for future work to investi-
gate the manner in which broad social trends, and/or macro-
social developments, are likely to impact upon the future
adoption of consensual and/or dissensual CSR practices. The
continuing spread of information and communication tech-
nologies (ICTs), for example might be thought to necessitate
that corporations increasingly adopt dissensual CSR prac-
tices: for ICTs potentially enable those with fringe or radical
views to more easily mobilize against a corporation whose
practices they consider illegitimate (for one reason or
another). Further, the continuing reality of religious differ-
ences, moral differences, and/or sociological differences,
around the globe, might result in multinational corporations
increasingly coming to think that, in certain circumstances,
consensual CSR is entirely impractical.
Finally, the paper highlights the need for more nuanced
and sophisticated work on the theoretical foundations of
descriptive and explanatory CSR research. In particular, I
suggest that developments of one or more of the actor-
centred institutional perspectives I have here outlined,
could prove particularly beneficial. Such research might
employ a variety of approaches. It might, for instance, seek
to more fully demonstrate the ways in which sociological
and ethical considerations support and/or help create the
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economic perspective. Alternatively, it might seek to
demonstrate or clarify the manner in which each of the
different perspectives are relevant (and/or most suited to)
explaining different subsets of business-society interac-
tions; and/or, to explaining why the different perspectives
are relevant at different levels of analysis.
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